The Nevada Irrigation District (NID) board meeting yesterday had the usual PG&E update on the Spaulding infrastructure repairs on its agenda. The discussion got heated after the PG&E spokesperson informed Directors that the root cause of the failures at Spaulding would not be shared with them or NID staff. Today, a letter from PG&E to FERC appears to contradict statements made by PG&E representatives in various meetings and press releases.
The report by Brandon Sanders, PG&E Sierra Division Government Affairs, was standard enough to begin with. Sanders repeated information on the completion of repairs on the South Yuba Pipe and that approximately 450 cfs of water are flowing through the Spaulding #1 powerhouse at this time, with one of the two discharge horns (PRV) in operation. He also reiterated repairs on Spaulding #2 powerhouse are underway with vendors working on critical component repairs.
A routine question by Director Karen Hull turned into this exchange:
Hull: “I had a question on the root cause analysis that was going to be provided to our board or to management, and I’d like to get an update on when our management team will be receiving that.”
Sanders: “So, what I’ve been told is that we’ve provided some initial findings to FERC, but that’s considered critical energy infrastructure information [CEII] and is not subject to public disclosure. So at this point in time, I don’t have a sense of the timing on any, you know, further release of information around that, but I think those conversations will be ongoing.”
General Manager Jennifer Hanson: “Brandon, that’s a little bit concerning, because we did receive an email indicating that PG&E was not willing to provide that. As we have previously discussed multiple times, I’ve had multiple discussions with different members of PG&E and I think the primary issue we’re having is that there are confidentiality clauses in our coordinated operating agreement [COA] that allow for each entity to provide confidential information. So it’s unclear as to why PG&E thinks it’s appropriate to use the security designation from FERC to deny us access to that information when we could obtain it anyways. We’re just gonna jump through a bunch of hoops to obtain it.”
Sanders: “Um, yeah, I haven’t really been briefed up on that piece. All I can say is that I was told it was not subject to disclosure under the coordinated operating agreement.”
General Manager Hanson pointed out it is in the public’s best interest that both entities have a common understanding of the cause and citing FERC secure infrastructure rules does not apply in this case. Sanders stated all he could commit to was to take the feedback back to the power generation leadership team. Hanson said that NID ultimately would be able to get the information, presumably through FERC.
Outrageous
NID directors were not appeased by Sander’s repeated offers to “take it back to leadership.” Director Hull said “This is kind of outrageous that you would not provide something we’ve been told that management would be given, that was made in multiple representations and meetings over these past months.” Sanders replied that he had found a note on is phone that the analysis “isn’t final, at least that’s my understanding… that’s how it was explained to me in a meeting yesterday.”
Director Heck referenced a previous memo sent to FERC by PG&E on September 24, 2024 and asked, “So I just want to be clear, are you telling us that your comments about this being protected under the critical infrastructure language is for both of those items?” Sanders responded “I don’t have that level of detail.” Heck retorted, “I add my voice to the choir here, this is truly outrageous… I expect PG&E to, for lack of a better word, cough it up.”
Director Bierwagen was equally unimpressed, “For me this whole process, the whole time I’m sitting here listening to these updates, it’s the frustration around this. This is our water, we have no control over the process of fixing it or investigating it or anything. We have no part in that and I’m feeling like we’re not even being allowed to be part of it.”
Director Johansen agreed with his fellow directors, “I’m with everyone else. I think PG&E knows the root cause, now they’re just trying to figure out how to package it.” Director Heck interjected, “Spin it.”
The memo Director Heck referenced reads, in part: This letter reports on the completion of Pacific Gas and Electric Company’s (PG&E) cause analysis and evaluation of repairs for damaged power generating system components at the Lake Spaulding development… PG&E’s cause analysis and evaluation repairs is provided in (Enclosure 1). The forensic cause analysis for the Spaulding No. 1 Powerhouse PRV discharge horns failure is provided in (Enclosure 2).” Both enclosures were redacted from public view under the Critical Energy Infrastructure Information (CEII) seal.
PG&E report filed with FERC today raises questions about prior PG&E statements
PG&E submitted a status update and request for extension of time until 12/15/2025 to complete repairs and file their final construction report (FCR) with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) today.
The publicly available cover letter states, in part, “Although PG&E successfully completed the work to safely return limited flows through the Spaulding No. 1 Powerhouse, additional work is required to release the project to full operation. Significant effort remains to replace the PRV B discharge horn and finish several lower priority tasks for final acceptance of the PRV A discharge horn. Additional work also remains to remove portions of the damaged concrete columns and protect the new columns and discharge chamber from long-term wear and deterioration.”
PG&E spokespeople, including power generation leadership, have repeatedly stated the work on the concrete columns was complete, and the first discharge horn was fully operational. Even the leadership of PG&E’s power management [“PG&E worked 24/7 to make the necessary repairs so we could restore flows as quickly as possible,” said Dave Gabbard, PG&E Vice President, Power Generation. “This was a very large, complex project as we discovered more extensive damage as the project progressed. I’m proud of our team as it moved with urgency and tenacity, and most importantly completed the work safely.” PG&E news release dated July 29, 2024.]
The new memo also states PG&E anticipates remobilizing crews to perform the remaining repair work in the late winter or early spring of 2025, after safe and reliable access to the powerhouse is restored following the upcoming winter and when water demands are low. The remaining work will take approximately 4 months to complete, according to the memo.
The much-cited COA
The Coordinated Operating Agreement (COA) NID’s General Manager was referring to pertains to a document signed in 2018 by a previous NID General Manager and a PG&E Vice President. It spelled out the ownership of various canals, reservoirs, powerhouses and other infrastructure owned by the two parties. It also codified operations and maintenance requirements, including water storage for the other entity in various reservoirs.
YubaNet obtained a copy of the COA by filing a public records act request in June of 2024.
The COA spells out the percentage of cost share under an extraordinary event. For example, PG&E can bill NID for 25% of the cost incurred for repairs to the Spaulding main tunnel.
The COA’s confidentiality clause reads, in part, “Subject to Section 8.18( d), the Receiving Party agrees to keep the Confidential Information received from the Disclosing Party hereunder in strict confidence and not disclose such Confidential Information to third parties ( excluding any parent, subsidiary and/or affiliate companies of the Receiving Party) and/or any other persons, except board members, employees, agents, consultants, and/or subcontractors of the Receiving Party with a “need to know'” (“Representatives”), and provided that such Representatives are bound by a materially similar obligation of confidentiality with respect to such Confidential Information as to which the Receiving Party is bound under this Agreement.”
In plain English, PG&E can share confidential information with NID staff and vice versa.
The NID meeting is available on YouTube.
